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INTRODUCTION
Stuart Banner’s The Decline of Natural Law: How American Lawyers Once
Used Natural Law and Why They Stopped addresses a “fundamental change in
American legal thought that took place in the late 19th and early 20th
centuries.”1 Prior to this change, lawyers routinely relied on natural law in their
arguments, and judges took those arguments seriously.2 Natural law gave judges
“a reservoir of principles . . . to draw upon” in cases that positive law could not
cleanly resolve, which made it easy to see judges as discovering law in those
cases.3 After the change, however, natural law dropped out of the lawyer’s
toolkit.4 Judges continued to rely on moral reasoning to decide hard cases, but
they were now thought to be making law.5
Banner’s goal, as his subtitle indicates, is to explain how American lawyers
once used natural law and why they stopped.6 The book is clearly written and a
pleasure to read: Banner deftly weaves quotations from a wide variety of sources
with analysis of what those sources reveal about the trajectory of natural law in
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1. STUART BANNER, THE DECLINE OF NATURAL LAW: HOW AMERICAN LAWYERS ONCE
USED NATURAL LAW AND WHY THEY STOPPED 1 (2021).
2. See id. at 1, 11.
3. Id. at 2.
4. Id. at 1.
5. Id. at 2, 68.
6. See id. at 2.
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the American legal system. He argues, among other things, that an explosion in
the number of reported cases available to lawyers in the nineteenth century
precipitated the decline of natural law.7 As more and more cases became
available, lawyers came to rely on those cases instead of natural law and, indeed,
came to view the cases themselves as sources of law rather than as evidence of
what the law already was.8
I am not a legal historian, and my aim here is neither to criticize nor affirm
the story that Banner tells. My purpose instead is to ask what significance that
story has for legal philosophers working in general jurisprudence. If Banner’s
account is right, what can it tell us about the nature of law—about the sort of
thing that law is, wherever and whenever law is found? I will argue that Banner’s
work has significant implications for both the substance and the methodology of
general jurisprudence. With respect to substance, his work suggests an answer
to when and why American lawyers’ concept of law came to cohere with
exclusive positivism—roughly, the view that the existence and content of law
necessarily depend on just social facts, not evaluative facts.
More specifically, Banner shows how a change in legal technology (a
dramatic rise in the number of reported cases and other positive sources of law)
brought about a change in practice (lawyers stopped relying on natural law and
turned instead to cases, statutes, and the like).9 That change in practice, in turn,
gradually brought about a shift in American lawyers’ concept of law: they went
from conceiving of law as depending partly on evaluative facts to conceiving of
it as depending on social facts alone.10 And yet vestiges of an earlier era when
lawyers did conceive of law as depending partly on evaluative facts remain part
of legal practice even today—e.g., in judges’ convention of writing their
opinions as if they are discovering what the law requires.11
With respect to methodology, Banner’s work vividly illustrates how our
concept of law is local to our own time, which suggests a more modest role for
conceptual analysis of law than is sometimes assumed. Our concept of law is
universal in the sense that it is how we conceive of law wherever and whenever
law is found. But it is also parochial in the sense that it reflects only how we
conceive of law and not necessarily how lawyers elsewhere conceive of law or
even how lawyers in our own jurisdiction conceived of law in centuries past.
Although I do not see this as any reason for legal philosophers to avoid
conceptual analysis, it is reason for them to be more careful in specifying whose
concept of law they are analyzing.
Below, Part I summarizes the pertinent parts of Banner’s book. Part II
overviews two debates in general jurisprudence: a substantive debate between
positivists and antipositivists over the relationship between law and morality and
a methodological debate over how to go about resolving the first debate. Part III
argues that Banner’s account of the decline of natural law helps explain an
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

See id. at 6, 119–28.
See id. at 4.
See id. at 4, 6, 119–28.
See infra Part III.
See BANNER, supra note 1, at 2, 241–46.
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apparent shift in American lawyers’ concept of law toward an exclusivepositivist concept. I also show how acknowledging this conceptual shift gives
exclusive positivists new resources for responding to common objections to their
theory. Lastly, Part IV turns to the implications that Banner’s account has for
the methodological debate.
I.

THE DECLINE OF NATURAL LAW

As noted at the outset, Banner examines a significant change in American
legal thought that occurred around the turn of the twentieth century.12 Before
this change, American lawyers regularly relied on natural law; afterwards, they
did not.13 Banner divides his study of this change into three sets of questions,
which structure the three parts of his book.14 The first set concerns how natural
law worked in practice: When did lawyers invoke natural law? How did they
ascertain its content? How did it relate to positive law?15 The second concerns
when and why lawyers stopped using natural law.16 And the third concerns what
happened after natural law fell into disuse: What took natural law’s place? Do
traces of natural law remain part of legal practice today?17
The first part of the book considers how natural law functioned in practice.
According to Banner, “American lawyers of the late 18th and early 19th
centuries had no doubt that natural law played an important role in the legal
system.”18 What was this natural law? The answer remains somewhat obscure
to me, and perhaps it was similarly obscure to lawyers of the time. Natural law
had a religious tinge: some lawyers said that it was made by God and impressed
on human nature.19 The core idea, however, seems to have been that natural law
consisted of principles of rational conduct, such that one could (at least with the
right education) discern its content simply by consulting one’s intuitions about
what is rational to do.20
How did lawyers use natural law? Banner describes two main uses. First,
lawyers relied on natural law to interpret statutes whose meaning was unclear.21

12. Id. at 1.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 2.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 11. My brief remarks about natural law here should not be taken to imply that there
is nothing more to say about natural-law theory or practice—there is, but it is only tangential to
what I argue below. See Mark C. Murphy, Natural Law Theory, in THE BLACKWELL GUIDE TO
THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 15, 18–19 (Martin P. Golding & William A.
Edmundson eds., 2005); JONATHAN CROWE, NATURAL LAW AND THE NATURE OF LAW 143
(2019); R. H. HELMHOLZ, NATURAL LAW IN COURT: A HISTORY OF LEGAL THEORY IN PRACTICE
2–5 (2015).
19. BANNER, supra note 1, at 12–13.
20. Id. at 15–17. It seems that lawyers of the time disagreed over how principles of natural
law could be discerned: some “cautioned that determining the content of natural law . . . required
considerable study,” while others said “that the law of nature was something instinctual that could
be determined by anyone, simply by attending to one’s innate sense of justice.” Id. at 14–15.
21. Id. at 19.
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The justification sometimes given for this practice was that the statutes
themselves were merely concretizations of natural law and had to be interpreted
accordingly.22 Second, lawyers used natural law to fill gaps left by positive
law.23 For instance, in a case addressing whether a mother had the right to make
employment arrangements for her minor children after their father had been
missing for years, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that, since “[t]he right is
not regulated by statute,” the case turned on “the clear principle of natural law”
that a mother has authority over her children.24
In the second part of the book, Banner argues that four legal and cultural
developments contributed to the decline of natural law: (1) the adoption of
written constitutions;25 (2) increased separation between law and religion;26 (3)
an explosion in the number of reported cases;27 and (4) disagreement over what
natural law required with respect to politically divisive issues of the time, like
slavery or race-based segregation.28 All of these could help explain an apparent
shift in American lawyers’ concept of law between the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries. But for the sake of brevity, I will focus on the third development—an
explosion in the number of reported cases—which strikes me as the most
causally significant precursor of this apparent shift.
Banner details the rapid rise in volumes of American case reports during the
nineteenth century.29 By one count, there were 8 such volumes in 1804 but 450
by 1836.30 Another count estimated that there were 3,100 volumes in 1883.31
Yet another concluded that there were 8,208 volumes in 1910 (a thousand-fold
increase in roughly a century).32 These numbers seem quaint by today’s
standards, but they were alarming to lawyers of the time. As one put it: “[W]e
are in a mighty sea of books . . . . We can scarce glance at one, ere another rises
to our view . . . .”33 Not only were these books expensive and inaccessible in
parts of the country, one could not possibly read them all; for the first time,
lawyers struggled to stay abreast of just the law of their home state.34

22. Id. at 22–23.
23. Id. at 27–31.
24. Id. at 28 (quoting Osborn v. Allen, 26 N.J.L. 388, 391, 393 (1857)). Interestingly, lawyers
disagreed over whether natural law trumped positive law, in the sense that courts could rely on it
to strike down contrary legislation. Id. at 71. Banner notes that “[t]here was . . . a steady stream of
cases, all though the 19th century, in which courts asserted the authority to strike down statutes
contrary to natural law.” Id. at 88. At the same time, there were also many cases in which courts
took the opposite view. Id. Judges never reached consensus on this issue; instead, the issue faded
from view as natural law fell into disuse. Id. at 95.
25. Id. at 71–95.
26. Id. at 96–118.
27. Id. at 119–36.
28. Id. at 137–63.
29. Id. at 119.
30. Id. at 120–21.
31. Id. at 121.
32. Id. at 121–22.
33. Id. at 121 (quoting JOSEPH WILLARD, AN ADDRESS TO THE MEMBERS OF THE BAR OF
WORCESTER COUNTY, MASSACHUSETTS, OCTOBER 2, 1829, at 110 (Lancaster, Carter, Andrews,
& Co. 1830)).
34. See id. at 126.
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As the number of reported cases rose, lawyers began to argue from precedent
more often, though many resisted this change.35 Banner explains that, during the
nineteenth century, calling someone a “case lawyer” was an insult; it suggested
that a lawyer knew only about reported cases and not the principles of natural
law behind those cases.36 As one judge quipped in 1856: “Put a [difficult] legal
question . . . to a mere ‘case lawyer,’ . . . and if he happens to remember a
reported case exactly in point, he will tell you how it has been decided. If he
recollects no such case he has no opinion to give.”37 Another judge complained
in 1878 that lawyers had become “mere hunters of cases, instead of thinkers
applying the maxims and principles of law.”38
Likewise, a lawyer wrote in 1882 that “it is a matter of common remark
among the elder school of lawyers and judges that the younger men at the bar
rely too much upon books and too little upon the elementary doctrines by which
all cases should be decided.”39 A treatise for trial attorneys stated in 1888: “The
lawyers least to be depended upon are those who are in constant pursuit of cases
. . and who, therefore, seldom have sufficient knowledge of principles.”40 By the
twentieth century, however, the term “case lawyer” had faded from use because,
as Banner puts it, “all lawyers had become case lawyers. There was no other
kind.”41 “As lawyers relied more on [cases], they relied less on . . . natural law”
until they gradually stopped citing it almost altogether.42
The third part of the book concerns the hole that natural law left in the legal
system: How were judges to decide hard cases if not by looking to natural law?
Banner describes two schools of thought on this question. The first, called
“classical legal thought,” tried to relocate principles of natural law from nature
to judicial opinions: judges could induce these principles from a mass of prior
opinions, and then the principles could resolve hard cases.43 The second, called
“legal realism,” simply accepted that there was no legally correct answer in hard
cases and that judges therefore had to make law.44 Although legal realism is
often thought of as a reaction to classical legal thought, Banner argues that both
schools emerged around the same time as reactions to the decline of natural

35. See id. at 128.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 129 (quoting ALFRED CONKLING, LEGAL REFORM: AN ADDRESS TO THE
GRADUATING CLASS OF THE LAW SCHOOL OF THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBANY, DELIVERED MARCH
27, 1856, at 11 (Albany, W.C. Little & Co. 1856)).
38. Id. at 131 (quoting CHARLES D. DRAKE, ADDRESS, DELIVERED MAY 8, 1878, AT THE
ANNUAL COMMENCEMENT OF THE CINCINNATI LAW SCHOOL 13 (Washington City, Thomas
McGill & Co. 1878)).
39. Id. at 130 (quoting J.L. High, What Shall Be Done with the Reports?, 3 AM. L. REV. 429,
439 (1882)).
40. Id. at 129 (quoting BYRON K. ELLIOTT & WILLIAM F. ELLIOTT, THE WORK OF THE
ADVOCATE: A PRACTICAL TREATISE CONTAINING SUGGESTIONS FOR PREPARATION AND TRIAL
58 (Indianapolis, Bowen-Merill Co. 1888)).
41. Id. at 134.
42. Id. at 136.
43. Id. at 188–89, 197.
44. Id. at 218–19.
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law,45 with legal realism ultimately becoming the dominant school.46
Banner quotes numerous lawyers and judges repudiating the once common
view that judges discover the law.47 A speaker at the American Bar
Association’s meeting in 1883 called the idea that judges never make law a
“resplendent fiction.”48 A guide for law students in 1891 posited that case law
was “a creation of the courts.”49 And Justice Holmes wrote in 1917 that “judges
do and must legislate.”50 By the mid-twentieth century, “[v]irtually all lawyers
agreed that judges make law.”51 Even Justice Scalia—a jurist known for his
formalism—said: “I am not so naïve . . . as to be unaware that judges in a real
sense ‘make’ law. But they make it as judges make it, which is to say as though
they were ‘finding’ it.”52
Banner closes the book by reflecting on “echoes” of natural law that persist
long after lawyers stopped relying on natural law.53 Natural law, he writes,
“lingers on in the voice lawyers and judges adopt in their professional lives.”54
When lawyers argue in court or judges write opinions, they tend to speak as if
courts always discover what the law requires; and yet in other contexts, they
acknowledge that courts must make law, at least in hard cases.55 Banner suggests
that “[t]his difference between what lawyers say and what they think is a
holdover from an era in which lawyers really did believe that judges found the
law. They would gradually stop believing this, but the official discourse of the
legal system did not change accordingly.”56
Something that I cannot convey in this brief summary is the sheer number and
variety of sources that Banner uses to support his points—articles, treatises,
speeches, letters, and opinions by a broad assortment of lawyers, judges, and law
professors. Particularly in light of this array of sources, I find Banner’s account
of the decline of natural law compelling. But as stated above, I do not intend to
criticize or affirm his account here, nor would I be the right person to do so. My
interest instead is in what his account, assuming that it accurately portrays a shift
in lawyers’ attitudes toward law, can teach us about the nature of law. To that
end, let us turn next to two debates in general jurisprudence, a substantive debate
and a methodological one.

45.
46.
47.
48.

Id. at 189.
See id. at 221.
Id. at 213–21.
Id. at 214 (quoting JOHN M. SHIRLEY, THE FUTURE OF OUR PROFESSION: A PAPER READ
BEFORE THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION 19 (Philadelphia, George S. Harris & Sons 1883)).
49. Id. (quoting EUGENE WAMBAUGH, THE STUDY OF CASES 35 (Boston, Little, Brown, &
Co. 1891)).
50. Id. at 220 (quoting S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 221 (1917) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting)).
51. Id. at 218–19.
52. Id. at 219 (quoting James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 549 (1991)
(Scalia, J., concurring in judgment)).
53. Id. at 223–49.
54. Id. at 246.
55. Id. at 213.
56. Id. at 246.
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II. DEBATES IN GENERAL JURISPRUDENCE
General jurisprudence is not concerned with the law of some jurisdiction at
some time but rather with the nature of law, wherever and whenever law is
found.57 A prominent debate in this area centers on the relationship between
evaluative facts (facts about what is good, rational, etc.) and the existence and
content of law (whether a legal norm exists and, if so, what it requires or
permits).58 The main camps in this debate are positivism and antipositivism.59
How to define these camps is itself contentious.60 But for present purposes, let
us say that positivism holds that the existence and content of law do not
necessarily depend on evaluative facts, while antipositivism holds that the
existence or content of law do necessarily depend on evaluative facts.61
So defined, positivism is consistent with law either depending or not
depending on evaluative facts. This sets up a division within the positivist camp.
On exclusive positivism, the existence and content of law necessarily depend on
just social facts (descriptive facts about what people think, say, do, etc.), never
on evaluative facts.62 By contrast, on inclusive positivism, the existence or
content of the law may depend on evaluative facts, though only if social facts
make evaluative facts relevant to whether a legal norm exists or what it directs.63
Thus, for exclusive positivists, evaluative reasoning is never required to find out
what the law is; but for inclusive legal positivists, evaluative reasoning may be
required to find out what the law is.
We should also note a division within the antipositivist camp, though it will
play no role in our discussion below. On one version of natural law theory, a
norm must pass a certain moral threshold to count as a legal norm.64 It follows
that very immoral legal texts, like the Fugitive Slave Act, do not create legal
norms. (As Banner rightly observes, lawyers who used natural law in prior
centuries need not have subscribed to natural law theory as legal philosophers
57. Andrei Marmor & Alexander Sarch, The Nature of Law, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA
PHILOSOPHY
1
(Edward
N.
Zalta
et
al.
eds.,
2019),
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2019/entries/lawphil-nature/
[https://perma.cc/KBY9ERDM].
58. See id. at 2–3.
59. See id. at 2, 4, 9.
60. For examples of different ways of formulating the positivism–antipositivism divide, see
Emad H. Atiq, There Are No Easy Counterexamples To Legal Anti-Positivism, 17 J. ETHICS & SOC.
PHIL. 1, 1–2 (2020); Mark Greenberg, How Facts Make Law, 10 LEGAL THEORY 157, 157–58
(2004); John Gardner, Legal Positivism: 5½ Myths, 46 AM. J. JURIS. 199, 199–201, 207–08 (2001).
61. The relevant notion of dependence here is the sort of metaphysical dependence that
metaphysicians call “grounding.” See generally Gideon Rosen, Metaphysical Dependence:
Grounding and Reduction, in MODALITY: METAPHYSICS, LOGIC, AND EPISTEMOLOGY 109 (Bob
Hale & Aviv Hoffmann eds., 2010); Jonathan Schaffer, On What Grounds What, in
METAMETAPHYSICS: NEW ESSAYS ON THE FOUNDATIONS OF ONTOLOGY 347 (David J. Chalmers,
David Manley & Ryan Wasserman eds., 2009).
62. See Marmor & Sarch, supra note 57, at 10.
63. See id.
64. See Murphy, supra note 18, at 18–19 (presenting this strong version of natural law
theory); CROWE, supra note 18, at 143 (same). There are also weaker versions of natural law theory,
on which a norm necessarily must pass a certain moral threshold to count as a central or
paradigmatic instance of a legal norm. See Murphy, supra note 18, at 21; CROWE, supra note 18,
at 143. These weaker versions are consistent with positivism, as defined here.
OF
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understand it today.65) A more recent strain of antipositivism, associated with
Ronald Dworkin, holds that the content of law depends on the best constructive
interpretation of a community’s legal and political history—on the interpretation
that best fits and justifies that history—which depends on evaluative facts.66
Behind the positivism–antipositivism debate is a methodological debate over
what these theories aim to achieve. On one view, the aim is to analyze our
concept of law (put to the side for now whom this “our” refers to).67 Our concept
of law is not some “brooding omnipresence in the sky.”68 It is simply our shared
understanding of the sort of thing that law is. The goal of conceptual analysis is
to clarify and systematize our shared, though often inchoate, intuitions about the
essential features of law and what counts as law.69 On this view, then, the subject
of the positivist–antipositivist debate is whether law—according to our shared
understanding of it or something suitably close to our shared understanding—
necessarily depends on evaluative facts.
A second view is that a theory of law aims to give a reductive analysis of law
itself: the goal is to fully explain one set of facts (law facts) in terms of a more
metaphysically basic set of facts (e.g., social facts).70 Whether this project is
separable from conceptual analysis is not clear. Law facts do not come
prelabeled as such. So it seems that conceptual analysis is necessary to determine
which facts are law facts and is likely to be dispositive of whether those law
facts reduce to social facts.71 In other words, conceptual analysis seems to be a
necessary and likely outcome-determinative precursor to any reductive analysis
of law. Still, it is at least clear that these first two views are both descriptive
projects, in the sense that neither requires evaluating the object of study—neither
requires asking whether law or our concept of it is good or bad.
A third view is normative: it claims that a theory of law aims to tell us what
our concept of law should be.72 At least at first glance, this third view need not
compete with either of the two prior views: it seems coherent to ask both whether
positivism is true of our actual concept of law (or of law itself) and whether

65. BANNER, supra note 1, at 4.
66. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 90 (1986).
67. See, e.g., SCOTT J. SHAPIRO, LEGALITY 13–18 (2011); JOSEPH RAZ, BETWEEN
AUTHORITY AND INTERPRETATION: ON THE THEORY OF LAW AND PRACTICAL REASON 17–24
(2009).
68. S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
69. Frank Jackson calls this “modest” conceptual analysis. See FRANK JACKSON, FROM
METAPHYSICS TO ETHICS: A DEFENCE OF CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS 42–44 (1998).
70. See, e.g., Andrei Marmor, Farewell to Conceptual Analysis (in Jurisprudence), in
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE NATURE OF LAW 209 (Wil Waluchow & Stefan Sciaraffa
eds., 2013); BRIAN LEITER, Beyond the Hart/Dworkin Debate: The Methodology Problem in
Jurisprudence, in NATURALIZING JURISPRUDENCE: ESSAYS ON AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND
NATURALISM IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 153, 180 (2007).
71. Cf. JACKSON, supra note 69, at 30–31 (“Although metaphysics is about what the world is
like, the questions we ask when we do metaphysics are framed in a language, and thus we need to
attend to what the users of the language mean by the words they employ to ask their questions.”).
72. See, e.g., Scott Hershovitz, The End of Jurisprudence, 124 YALE L.J. 1160, 1173 (2015);
Stephen R. Perry, Interpretation and Methodology in Legal Theory, in LAW AND INTERPRETATION:
ESSAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 97, 123 (Andrei Marmor ed., 1995); DWORKIN, supra note 66, at
49–53.
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positivism is true of the concept of law that we should hold.73 Yet some
proponents of this third view make the stronger claim that a descriptive theory
of law is impossible—that any theory of law is inescapably normative.74 There
are complex issues here, but for reasons that others have stated before, I do not
find this stronger claim persuasive, and I will proceed on the assumption that a
descriptive theory of law is possible.75
The rest of this Review focuses on exclusive positivism, so it is worth saying
a bit more in that regard. There are two main arguments for exclusive positivism.
The first argument points to the theory’s ability to explain certain aspects of legal
thought.76 For instance, it explains why we distinguish between an argument’s
legal acceptability and its moral merit or between judges’ legal skill and their
moral leanings.77 It also explains why we tend to see law as settled to the extent
that we agree on social facts (e.g., what a statute communicates) and as unsettled
to the extent that we disagree about those facts.78 Relatedly, it explains why we
tend to see judges as making law insofar as their decisions rest on not just social
facts but also evaluative facts.79
The second argument, which is owed to Joseph Raz, concerns the role of law
in practical reasoning. According to Raz, an essential feature of law is that it
claims to give its subjects legitimate authoritative directives.80 It seems to follow
that law must be the sort of thing that has the capacity to give such directives.81
But for law to have that capacity, we must be able to identify its existence and
content without weighing the very reasons that it claims to settle for us; if we
had to weigh for ourselves the reasons bearing on how we ought to behave before
we could know what the law directs us to do, then the law would not be acting
as an authority.82 The existence and content of law must therefore be identifiable
by social facts alone.83
Put another way, law necessarily purports to give, and so must be the sort of
thing that can give, both first-order reasons to act and second-order preemptive
reasons not to act based on other first-order reasons.84 By analogy, an arbitrator
will weigh first-order reasons bearing on what the parties ought to do, but once
the arbitrator issues a decision, that decision gives the parties (i) a first-order
reason to comply and (ii) a preemptive reason not to act based on the first-order
73. The latter is often called “normative positivism.” See Torben Spaak & Patricia Mindus,
Introduction, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO LEGAL POSITIVISM 1, 12–13 (Torben Spaak &
Patricia Mindus eds., 2021).
74. See, e.g., Perry, supra note 72, at 123; DWORKIN, supra note 66, at 49–53.
75. See generally Andrei Marmor, Legal Positivism: Still Descriptive and Morally Neutral,
26 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 683 (2006); Julie Dickson, Methodology in Jurisprudence: A Critical
Survey, 10 LEGAL THEORY 117 (2004).
76. See JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 48–50 (1979).
77. Id. at 49.
78. Id. at 49–50.
79. Id.
80. Joseph Raz, Authority, Law and Morality, 68 MONIST 295, 300 (1985).
81. See id.
82. Id. at 304.
83. Id. at 305–06.
84. See id. at 297.
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reasons that the arbitrator has already weighed.85 The arbitrator’s decision could
not give the parties such a preemptive reason if they could only identify it by
weighing the very first-order reasons that it purports to preempt.86 The decision
must be identifiable by social facts alone.87
So too the law must be identifiable by just social facts, like facts about
institutions publishing texts and about what those texts communicate. If that is
right, then it is practically inevitable that the law will fail to give determinate
direction in some cases. Given defects like ambiguity or vagueness in legal texts
and the variety of cases arising before courts, there will sometimes be no single
answer to what the law directs a court to decide—the relevant social facts are
bound to run out before cases do. There is thus a tight connection between
exclusive positivism and legal realism: if exclusive positivism is correct, it is
practically inevitable that the law will be indeterminate as to some cases and that
courts will have to make law in those cases.
III. THE RISE OF EXCLUSIVE POSITIVISM
My overview of these debates has, no doubt, been too quick, but let us
consider now what light Banner’s work can shed in this regard. Below, I argue
that (i) Banner portrays a shift in American lawyers’ concept of law from an
inclusive-positivist or antipositivist concept to an exclusive-positivist one (from
conceiving of law as at least potentially depending on evaluative facts to
conceiving of it as necessarily depending on social facts alone); (ii) Banner
provides a plausible explanation for why that shift occurred, which centers on a
dramatic rise in the number of written sources of law; and (iii) acknowledging
this conceptual shift gives exclusive positivists new resources for responding to
common objections to their theory.
As we saw above, Banner contends that American lawyers in the early
nineteenth century took certain principles of rational conduct to be part of their
legal system and understood those principles to determine what the law directed
in some cases.88 This suggests that lawyers of the time did not consider authority
(in the Razian sense) to be an essential feature of law: they did not conceive of
law as essentially providing preemptive reasons. Rather, they thought that courts
sometimes had to look to principles of rational conduct—to ask what was the
rational thing to do—to find out what the law required.89 They believed that
evaluative facts fixed some of the content of their law and thereby determined
what the law directed courts to decide in some cases.90
Banner clearly believes that this is not true of American lawyers’ concept of
85. Id. at 297–98.
86. Id.
87. See id. at 297.
88. Whether these lawyers thought of natural law as contingently part of their legal system or
as necessarily part of every legal system is less clear (though Banner offers some evidence for the
latter). See BANNER, supra note 1, at 13–14. The key for our purposes is that their intuitions about
law did not accord with exclusive positivism.
89. See id. at 1, 13–14.
90. See id.
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law today—that American lawyers now share an exclusive-positivist concept of
law.91 Banner is a historian, not a philosopher, so he does not use these terms,
but he does imply that contemporary American lawyers conceive of law as
necessarily depending on social facts alone.92 He writes that we “now believe
that all the rules of the legal system are created by humans.”93 What judges once
called “natural law,” we today “call policymaking—the explanation of why one
rule makes the most sense, in situations where alternative rules are possible.”94
In such situations, we now describe judges as engaging in “interstitial
lawmaking, in the gaps where no law yet exists.”95
Admittedly, Banner provides less evidence to support his view of how
American lawyers’ conceive of law today than he does to support his view of
how they conceived of it in centuries past. For the most part, he seems to think
it obvious that lawyers today believe that judges make law to the extent that they
base their decisions on evaluative facts.96 I am inclined to agree; indeed, I think
that this is likely part of what lawyers mean by the oft-repeated cliché that “we
are all legal realists now.”97 But I also recognize that not everyone finds this as
obvious as Banner and I do,98 and further empirical study of contemporary
lawyers’ attitudes toward the relationship between evaluative facts and the
existence and content of law would be needed to prove it.
Regardless, what I find most interesting about Banner’s work, and the reason
why I think that it is ultimately good news for exclusive positivists, is that it
presents a plausible story for why such a conceptual shift would have occurred.99
Whereas there were comparatively few written sources of law before the mideighteenth century, there has been an amazing proliferation of such sources from
that time onward.100 Whereas there were once comparatively few social facts to
fix the content of American law,101 there is now an abundance. There is thus far
less reason for judges to resort to evaluative facts to dispose of cases today, and
in those relatively rare cases where judges do resort to evaluative facts, it is much
easier to understand them as making law.

91. See id. at 1.
92. See id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 3.
95. Id. at 247.
96. See supra notes 47–56 and accompanying text.
97. See Stephen Nayak-Young, Delimiting the Proper Bounds of the “New Legal Realism,”
12 INT’L J. CONST. L. 1008, 1017 & n.34 (2014) (collecting uses of the cliché).
98. See Emad H. Atiq, Legal Positivism and the Moral Origins of Legal Systems, CANADIAN
J.L. & JURIS. (forthcoming 2022) (manuscript at 22–24), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3969405
[https://perma.cc/P7X3-NXC8].
99. Atiq contends that, if positivists wish to claim that there has been a shift in our concept of
law, they need “an account of conceptual change—how a term with a putatively moral meaning
ended up referring to a subject amenable to positivistic analysis.” Id. at 4. The next several
paragraphs give at least the start of such an account.
100. See supra notes 29–34 and accompanying text.
101. There were, of course, a great many social facts about custom that could have fixed some
of the content of American law prior to the mid-eighteenth century. But unlike written sources of
law, facts about custom were more difficult to discern and less likely to yield determinate answers
to what the law directed in specific cases.
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Our concept of law is a concept of a practice; it makes sense that, as new
technology changes the practice, our concept may change too. Banner recounts
how a rise in reported cases, from a handful of volumes in the early nineteenth
century to thousands by century’s end, made it possible for lawyers to argue
from precedent far more often than ever before.102 It seems plausible that this
change in behavior could impact their concept of law—that they might, bit by
bit, come to see reported cases as sources of law rather than as evidence of what
the law already was. And from there, it is just a small step to see reported cases
and other social facts as the sole sources of law and to regard courts as making
law insofar as they rest their decisions on anything else.
Banner focuses on the late nineteenth to early twentieth centuries, but further
changes in legal technology in the twentieth century may have accelerated or
solidified this conceptual shift. Not only did the number of reported cases
continue to rise in the twentieth century, this period also saw a movement toward
codification and an attendant increase in the number of statutes.103 The U.S.
Code grew from two volumes in 1928 to twenty-nine volumes in 1988, and there
was comparable growth in state codes104—think, in particular, of widespread
adoption of uniform laws like the Uniform Commercial Code or Model Penal
Code. This proliferation of statutes may have further encouraged lawyers to view
law as necessarily depending on social facts alone.
The twentieth century also saw the expansion of the administrative state and,
accordingly, a dramatic rise in the number of regulations. The Code of Federal
Regulations grew from 15 volumes when it was first published in 1939 to 110
volumes in 1967.105 In addition, there are now countless administrative guidance
documents.106 Although not technically sources of law, these documents may be
cited in lawyers’ briefs and may persuade courts to adopt a certain interpretation
of a statute or regulation. Finally, the advent of word-searchable databases like
Westlaw and LexisNexis has made it easier than ever before for lawyers to
search for cases, statutes, regulations, and the like—that is, to find social facts
that speak directly to some legal question.
In sum, whereas there were comparatively few written sources of law two
centuries ago, we find ourselves awash in a sea of such sources today, and we
102. BANNER, supra note 1, at 119; see also supra notes 29–34 and accompanying text.
103. Cf. GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 1 (1982) (“The last
fifty to eighty years have seen a fundamental change in American law. In this time we have gone
from a legal system dominated by the common law . . . to one in which statutes, enacted by
legislatures, have become the primary source of law.”).
104. See Robert C. Ellickson, Taming Leviathan: Will the Centralizing Tide of the Twentieth
Century Continue into the Twenty-First?, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 101, 105 (2000); see also Felix
Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 527, 527 (1947)
(noting a dramatic rise in the number of statutes).
105. OFF. OF THE FED. REG., A BRIEF HISTORY COMMEMORATING THE 70TH ANNIVERSARY
OF THE PUBLICATION OF THE FIRST ISSUE OF THE FEDERAL REGISTER 4, 10 (2006),
https://www.archives.gov/files/federal-register/the-federal-register/history.pdf
[https://perma.cc/MVB4-83PW].
106. Nicholas R. Parrillo, Federal Agency Guidance and the Power to Bind: An Empirical
Study of Agencies and Industries, 36 YALE J. REG. 165, 167–68 (2019) (“Nobody knows exactly
how much guidance there is, . . . but its page count . . . is estimated to dwarf that of actual
regulations by a factor of twenty, forty, or even two hundred.”).
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have the tools to make them accessible and useable. For most legal questions
that arise today, it is easy to find social facts that definitively answer the
question, and lawyers are in the habit of relying on precisely those facts. While
there remain hard cases in which social facts fail to fully determine what the law
directs, those cases are far, far rarer than they once were, and that rarity makes
it much more palatable to view courts as making law in those cases. This is at
least the start of an explanation for why American lawyers would come to share
an exclusive-positivist concept of law.
Assuming that such a conceptual shift occurred, it goes a long way toward
accounting for aspects of contemporary legal practice that might otherwise seem
in tension with exclusive positivism. Consider judges’ convention of
announcing their holdings in hard cases as if they are discovering law rather than
making it. Antipositivists take this as a sign that judges understand evaluative
facts to resolve what the law requires in such cases, which suggests that our
concept of law does not accord with exclusive positivism.107 The burden is then
on exclusive positivists to explain why that is wrong. The story told above gives
an answer: this convention is a vestige of a former concept of law, a concept that
judges once held but no longer do.
Judges developed the practice of announcing their holdings as if they were
discovering the law long ago when they really did take themselves to be
discovering law, and they never abandoned it even after our concept of law
changed. To be sure, exclusive positivists should also explain why judges never
abandoned this practice, but that is not hard to do. One might point to simple
inertia (generations of lawyers were introduced to legal reasoning by reading
nineteenth-century cases and went on to imitate those cases’ style as judges) or
to various rhetorical or political reasons (it is more persuasive and more
consistent with the prevailing conception of the judicial role for judges to speak
as though they are announcing what the law already is).
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR METHODOLOGY
As explained above, conceptual analysis of law aims to explicate our concept
of law—our shared understanding of the sort of thing that law is. An upshot of
our discussion so far is that our concept of law is more parochial—more limited
by time and place—than it is sometimes assumed to be. Banner’s work illustrates
just how different contemporary American lawyers’ concept of law is from that
of lawyers in the same jurisdiction a mere two centuries ago. In this last part, I
argue that (i) our concept of law being parochial in this way does not make
conceptual analysis unfit as a methodology for general jurisprudence, and (ii)
conceptual analysis of law remains a worthwhile project, notwithstanding its
limitations.

107. See Emad H. Atiq, Legal Obligation and Its Limits, 38 LAW & PHIL. 109, 144–45 (2019);
DWORKIN, supra note 66, at 37–39. Acknowledging a shift in American lawyers’ concept of law
also implies that antipositivists should not rely on nineteenth-century cases to refute exclusive
positivism. Cf. DWORKIN, supra note 66, at 15–19 (discussing Riggs v. Palmer, 22 N.E. 188 (N.Y.
1889)).
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With respect to the first point, I hope to build on what Raz says about
conceptual analysis of law. He explains that, while conceptual analysis aims to
elucidate the essential properties of law, it is part of “our common understanding
of the law that its nature . . . changes over time.”108 The way to resolve this
tension is by recognizing that conceptual analysis aims only to explicate the
concept of law that we hold here and now.109 It identifies properties that law
necessarily has according to our concept, even though we hold that concept only
contingently.110 Conceptual analysis of law is thus “a parochial study of an
aspect of our culture;” it is largely about advancing our self-understanding of
our own culture’s institutions and practices.111
While our concept of law is parochial in the sense that it is our concept and
may differ from other communities’ concept, it is universal in the sense that it is
our shared understanding of the nature of law, wherever and whenever law
exists.112 A community need not possess our concept of law to have law
according to our concept.113 As long as we bear in mind that we are analyzing
our concept, we can sensibly talk about the necessary features of law everywhere
and anywhere, including in communities whose concept of law differs from our
own.114 That said, we should remember that, insofar as we look to only our
concept, we may not fully understand other communities’ law because we may
remain unaware of how they conceive of their law.115
The question remains: When we talk about analyzing our concept of law, to
whom should this “our” refer? Raz, at times, seems to have in mind a very broad
group—something like all of modern Western civilization.116 That would
assume that the same, or a quite similar, concept of law has been shared across
many jurisdictions for centuries. I take Banner’s work to suggest that the “our”
in question should be construed much more narrowly. Or rather, since whose
concept of law we choose to analyze is mostly a function of our theoretical
interests, if our goal is to give a definitive answer to the positivist–antipositivist
debate, then we should analyze contemporary American lawyers’ concept of law
or a similarly restricted community’s concept.
Another way of putting the same point is that any concept of law that is shared
across many jurisdictions and times will likely be too thin to be of much
interest—and certainly too thin to resolve the positivist–antipositivist debate.
That being so, there are two ways for conceptual analysis to proceed: either
conclude that the answer to the question under discussion is indeterminate or
check to see whether smaller communities have more determinate concepts of
108. RAZ, supra note 67, at 25–27.
109. Id. at 27.
110. Id. at 46; see also Brian H. Bix, Raz on Necessity, 22 L. & PHIL. 537, 549 (2003); Jules
L. Coleman, Incorporationism, Conventionality, and the Practical Difference Thesis, 4 LEGAL
THEORY 381, 393 n.24 (1998).
111. RAZ, supra note 67, at 31–32.
112. Id. at 32, 38.
113. Id. at 95.
114. See id. at 33, 96.
115. Id. at 96.
116. Id. at 38.
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law, and if so, analyze those concepts.117 I am advocating for the latter route. For
conceptual analysis to yield determinate answers to traditional questions in
general jurisprudence, the object of study should be a parochial concept of law,
e.g., contemporary American lawyers’ concept.
Why lawyers’ concept and not, say, laypersons’ concept? It is lawyers who
practice law, so it is generally more illuminating of legal practice to analyze their
concept. Also, laypersons’ intuitions about the essential features of law and what
counts as law may be too indeterminate to yield an interesting theory of law.
Most importantly, I suspect that laypersons conceive of law as whatever it is that
lawyers think is law—that they outsource, so to speak, their concept of law to
the relevant experts.118 Much the same is likely true of scientific concepts like
the concept of electrons. I have the minimal competence required to use the word
“electron” correctly on some occasions, but ultimately, I understand electrons to
be whatever it is that physicists say they are.
One might worry that, if we start down this path, there is no nonarbitrary end
to it. Why stop at contemporary American lawyers’ concept? Why not analyze
an even more parochial concept, like that of Democrat lawyers, Republican
lawyers, New York lawyers, or Republican New York lawyers who served in
the first Bush Administration? As already noted, the choice of a concept to
analyze is mostly a function of our theoretical interests. It is interesting to see
how lawyers, the experts on the law of some system, conceive of law. It is less
interesting to analyze more granular groups’ concept, particularly as they likely
all agree on the sort of thing that law is anyway (even while disagreeing over
many moral or political issues adjacent to law).
None of this means that philosophers working in different jurisdictions have
nothing to say to each other. Not only is it worth analyzing the concept of law
operative in our community, it is worth comparing that concept to the concepts
operative in other communities—a sort of “comparative jurisprudence.” The key
is that we can do this comparative work without trying to describe an
overarching concept of law shared by every community. While we should expect
significant overlap between different communities’ concepts of law (that is why
it makes sense to call them all “concepts of law”), we should also expect
differences, like that postulated above between the concepts operative in the
United States in the nineteenth century versus today.
Some may think this a pyrrhic victory for conceptual analysis: If our analysis
is limited to such a parochial concept, why should philosophers engage in it at
all? Such analysis seems to be, as Brian Leiter puts it, “banal descriptive
sociology of the Gallup-poll variety”—empirical work that is better suited to
social scientists than to philosophers.119 I disagree, and this leads to my second
point, which is that conceptual analysis of law remains a worthwhile project
even if it is analysis of a parochial concept. Law is one of our most complex and
117. Cf. Kenneth Einar Himma, Conceptual Jurisprudence: An Introduction to Conceptual
Analysis and Methodology in Legal Theory, 26 REVUS 65, 73 (2015) (discussing these two options).
118. Cf. Hilary Putnam, The Meaning of “Meaning”, 7 MINN. STUD. PHIL. SCI. 131, 144–45
(1975) (positing a division of linguistic labor with respect to natural-kind words like “gold”).
119. LEITER, supra note 70, at 177.
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socially significant practices. Just clearly formulating questions about the nature
of law can be difficult philosophical work (witness the disagreement over how
to define positivism).
Most lawyers have given little thought to the essential features of law; their
intuitions on the subject may be muddled or even internally inconsistent. It is
the job of philosophers to pump our intuitions with cases or thought experiments
and then systematize those intuitions as well as possible, perhaps making small
refinements along the way to reach a theory that possesses epistemic virtues like
simplicity, coherence, etc. Much of this can be done from the armchair by
anyone sufficiently familiar with the legal community in question. Yet empirical
work—including historical studies like Banner’s or even Gallup-type polls of
lawyers—may also be helpful, and philosophers should take such work into
account, probably more than they do now.
Not only is this properly philosophical work, it is far from complete. For
instance, Mark Greenberg has argued in recent years that positivists lack an
adequate account of how legal texts like constitutions, statutes, and judicial
opinions contribute to legal content.120 I agree that positivists have not yet fully
answered this challenge.121 Similarly, Dworkin, and more recently Scott
Shapiro, has argued that traditional positivism cannot explain “theoretical
disagreements” in legal practice.122 I at least believe that more needs to be said
on the subject.123 I suspect that further analysis of contemporary American
lawyers’ concept of law can answer these challenges and vindicate exclusive
positivism, but that work is still in progress.
Finally, analyzing our current concept of law seems to be, if not a necessary,
at least an important precursor to understanding whether our concept of law
should change. It is hard to know whether our concept of law should change
without knowing what it is now. It may even be hard to know the extent to which
our concept of law can change without first comparing the concepts of law
operative in various communities, past or present. So it seems that even
philosophers who are primarily interested in the normative project of asking
what our concept of law should be—who are primarily interested in conceptual
ethics or conceptual engineering124—should still have some interest in
descriptive analysis of various parochial concepts of law.

120. See Mark Greenberg, The Standard Picture and Its Discontents, in 1 OXFORD STUDIES
72–102 (Leslie Green & Brian Leiter eds., 2011).
121. For the beginning of a response to Greenberg, see Bill Watson, In Defense of the Standard
Picture: What the Standard Picture Explains that The Moral Impact Theory Cannot, LEGAL
THEORY (forthcoming 2022) (on file with author).
122. See Scott J. Shapiro, The “Hart-Dworkin” Debate: A Short Guide for the Perplexed, in
RONALD DWORKIN 22, 35–43 (Arthur Ripstein ed., 2007); DWORKIN, supra note 66, at 4–6.
123. For my position, see Bill Watson, How to Answer Dworkin’s Argument from Theoretical
Disagreement Without Attributing Confusion or Disingenuity to Legal Officials, CAN. J. L. & JURIS.
(forthcoming) (on file with author).
124. For background on conceptual ethics and conceptual engineering, see generally Herman
Cappelen & David Plunkett, Introduction: A Guided Tour of Conceptual Engineering and
Conceptual Ethics, in CONCEPTUAL ENGINEERING AND CONCEPTUAL ETHICS 1 (Alexis Burgess,
Herman Cappelen & David Plunkett eds., 2020).
IN PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 39,
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CONCLUSION
My main goal in writing this Review has been to bring Banner’s excellent
book to the attention of legal philosophers by noting the issues that it raises for
general jurisprudence. These are complex issues, and I have really only
scratched the surface of them here. I have argued for a conclusion that is modest
yet surprising. It is modest because I have not shown that there was in fact a shift
in American lawyers’ concept of law. I have only shown that if Banner’s
portrayal of lawyers’ attitudes toward law in the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries is accurate, then it seems likely that such a shift occurred and that there
is a plausible explanation for why it occurred: as the number of positive sources
of law dramatically increased, and as lawyers relied on them more and more,
lawyers slowly came to view such sources as the only sources of law.
My conclusion is surprising because legal philosophers have not properly
attended to the possibility that there was such a significant shift in American
lawyers’ concept of law in the last two centuries. Attending to this possibility
could open a new path forward in the age-old debate between positivists and
antipositivists, at least insofar as that debate is about conceptual analysis. The
result may be that our concept of law is more parochial than we initially thought.
But I do not see this as any reason to give up on conceptual analysis of law; I
see it only as reason to be more careful in specifying whose concept we are
analyzing. We should also be aware that our concept of law is liable to be a
moving target, such that our analysis of it may require updating, as advances in
technology, cultural changes, and other influences continue to act upon it.

